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Summary
Legislation establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (P.L. 107-296)
included provisions for an information analysis element within the new department.  It
did not transfer to DHS existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies
but envisioned an analytical office utilizing the products of other agencies – both
unevaluated information and finished reports – to provide warning of terrorist attacks,
assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for remedial actions at federal, state,
and local levels, and by the private sector. In January 2003, the Administration
announced its intention to establish a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
that will be assigned many of the tasks envisioned for the DHS informational analysis
element.  This report examines different approaches to improving the information
analysis function and the sharing of information among federal agencies. It will be
updated as circumstances warrant.
Introduction
Better intelligence is held by many observers to be a crucial factor in preventing
terrorist attacks.  Concerns have been expressed that no single agency or office in the
federal government prior to September 11, 2001 was in a position to “connect the dots”
between diffuse bits of information that might have provided clues to the planned attacks.
Testimony before the two intelligence committees’ Joint Inquiry on the September 11
attacks indicated that significant information in the possession of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies was not fully shared with other agencies and that intelligence on
potential terrorist threats against the United States was not fully exploited.
For many years, the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information was
circumscribed by administrative policies and statutory prohibitions.  Beginning in the
early 1990s, however, much effort has gone into improving interagency coordination.1 
After the September 11 attacks, a number of statutory obstacles were addressed by the
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USA-Patriot Act of 2001 and other legislation.2  Nevertheless, there has been no one place
where the analytical effort is centered; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was
designed to remedy that perceived deficiency as is the new Terrorist Threat Integration
Center announced by the President in his January 2003 State of the Union address.
Background
The Bush Administration’s legislative proposal for a Department of Homeland
Security,  released July 16, 2002, was incorporated in H.R. 5005, introduced on June 24,
2002 by Representative Armey.  Title II of the bill, Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, as subsequently amended and passed by the House on July 26,
included provisions to establish an Intelligence Analysis Center to give intelligence
support to the homeland security effort and to identify priorities for measures to protect
key sources and critical infrastructures.  In the Senate, Senator Lieberman had introduced
legislation (S. 2452) to establish a Department of National Homeland Security on May
2, 2002.  The original version of S. 2452 did not address the intelligence function, but
subsequent amendments in the nature of a substitute included provisions establishing a
Directorate of Intelligence as an integral part of the new department. After the November
2002 elections a modified version of homeland security legislation was introduced by
Representative Armey and passed by the House on November 13, 2002. Subsequently,
both House and Senate passed an amended version of H.R. 5005, and the bill was signed
by the President on November 25, 2002, becoming P.L. 107-296. 
The final version of the Homeland Security Act established a Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection headed by an Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate) with an Assistant Secretary of Information
Analysis (appointed by the President).  The legislation, especially the Information
Analysis section, seeks to promote close ties between intelligence analysts and those
responsible for assessing vulnerabilities of key U.S. infrastructure. The bill envisions an
intelligence entity focused on receiving and analyzing information3 from other
government agencies and using it to provide warning of terrorist attacks and for
addressing vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit. 
DHS is not intended to duplicate the collection effort of intelligence agencies; it will
not have its own agents, satellites, or signals intercept sites. Major intelligence agencies
are not transferred to the DHS, although some DHS elements, including Customs and the
Coast Guard, will continue to collect information that is crucial to analyzing terrorist
threats. 
The legislation establishing DHS envisioned an information analysis element with
the responsibility for acquiring and reviewing information from the agencies of the
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Intelligence Community, from law enforcement agencies, state and local government
agencies, and unclassified publicly available information (known as open source
information or “osint”) from books, periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, media, etc. The
legislation is explicit that, “Except as otherwise directed by the President,  the Secretary
[of DHS] shall have such access as the Secretary considers necessary to all information,
including reports, assessments, analyses, and unevaluated intelligence relating to threats
of terrorism against the United States and to other areas of responsibility assigned by the
Secretary, and to all information concerning infrastructures or other vulnerabilities of the
United States to terrorism, whether or not such information has been analyzed, that may
be collected, possessed, or prepared by any agency of the Federal Government.”4
DHS analysts would be charged with using this information to identify and assess
the nature and scope of terrorist threats; producing comprehensive vulnerability
assessments of key resources and infrastructure; identifying priorities for protective and
support measures by DHS, by other agencies of the federal government, state and local
government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.  They will
disseminate information to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response
to, terrorist attacks against the U.S.  The intelligence element is also charged with
recommending measures necessary for protecting key resources and critical infrastructure
in coordination with other federal agencies.  
DHS would be responsible for ensuring that any material received is protected from
unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties.
(This provision addresses a concern that sensitive personal information made available
to DHS analysts could be misused.)  As is the case for other federal agencies that handle
classified materials, intelligence information would be transmitted, retained, and
disseminated consistent with policies established under the authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sources and methods and similar
authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement information.5
Concerns about DHS Intelligence
Despite enactment of the Homeland Security Act, it is clear that significant concerns
persisted within the Administration about the new department’s ability to analyze
intelligence and law enforcement information.  Media accounts suggest that these
concerns center on DHS’ status as a new and untested agency and the potential risks
involved in forwarding “raw” intelligence to the DHS intelligence component.6 Another
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concern is that a new entity, rather than long-established intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, would be relied on to produce all-source intelligence relating to the most serious
threats facing the country.
DHS Role in the Intelligence Community.  The U.S. Intelligence Community
consists of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some 14 other agencies;7 it provides
information in various forms to the White House and other federal agencies (as well as
to Congress).  In addition, law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), also collect information for use in the federal government.8  Within
the Intelligence Community, priorities for collection (and to some extent for analysis) are
established by the DCI,9 based in practice on inter-agency discussions.  Being “at the
table” when priorities are discussed, it is widely believed, helps ensure equitable
allocations of limited collection resources.  
The Homeland Security Act would make the DHS information analysis element a
member of the Intelligence Community, thus giving DHS a formal role when intelligence
collection and analysis priorities are being addressed.  It will also facilitate access to
intelligence databases and other analytical resources.  Nonetheless, the relationship of
DHS to the Intelligence Community would not be as close – at least initially – as that of
other intelligence agencies that have long experience in dealing with national security
questions and in dealing with jurisdictional issues.  
The Question of “Raw” Intelligence.  There has been discussion in the media
whether DHS will have access to “raw” intelligence or only to finished analytical
products, but these reports may reflect uncertainty regarding the definition of “raw”
intelligence.  A satellite photograph standing by itself might be considered “raw” data, but
it would be useless unless something were known about where and when it was taken.
Thus, satellite imagery supplied to DHS would under almost any circumstances have to
include some analysis.  The same would apply to signals intercepts.  Reports from human
agents present special challenges.  Some assessment of the reliability of the source would
have to be provided, but information that would identify a specific individual is normally
retained within a very small circle of intelligence officials so as to reduce the risk of
unauthorized disclosure and harm to the source.
The issue of the extent and nature of information forwarded to DHS has proved to
be difficult.   Reviewing copies of summary reports prepared by existing agencies is seen
by some observers as inadequate for the task of putting together a meaningful picture of
terrorist capabilities and intentions and providing timely warning.  On the other hand,
there is a need to ensure that DHS would not be inundated with vast quantities of data and
that highly sensitive information is not given wider dissemination than absolutely
necessary.10 
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Analytical Quality.  The key test for homeland security will of course be the
quality of the analytical product–whether terrorist groups can be identified and timely
warning given of plans for attacks on the U.S.  While most observers acknowledge that
focusing in one office the responsibility for identifying terrorist threats will remedy a
fundamental limitation of existing arrangements, it is also understood that establishing
such an office in a new agency may have complications.  The types of information that
have to be analyzed come from disparate sources and require a variety of analytical skills
that are not in plentiful supply.  Academic institutions prepare significant numbers of
linguists and area specialists, but training in the inner workings of clandestine terrorist
entities is less often undertaken.  Analysts with law enforcement backgrounds may not be
attuned to the foreign environments from which terrorist groups emerge.  DHS would
begin with analysts detailed from existing intelligence and law enforcement agencies
along with, presumably, some newly hired personnel. There is concern about previous
bureaucratic competitors merging effectively and a culture of objectivity and adherence
to high standards being established from the outset.
The Terrorist Threat Integration Center  
President Bush, in his State of the Union address delivered on January 28, 2003,
called for the establishment of a new Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) that
would merge and analyze all threat information in a single location under the direction of
the DCI.  According to Administration spokesmen, TTIC will eventually encompass
CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, along with
elements of other agencies, including DOD and DHS.  Initially to be located at the CIA
Headquarters, TTIC will eventually move to a separate location.  Details regarding the
new center remain uncertain, but its stated responsibilities are to “integrate terrorist-
related information collected domestically and abroad” and to provide “terrorist threat
assessments for our national leadership.”11 
TTIC appears to be designed to assume at least some of the functions intended for
DHS’ information analysis division.   Making the DCI responsible for TTIC will facilitate
its ability to use highly sensitive classified information and TTIC can expand upon the
relationships that have evolved in the CTC that was established in CIA’s Operations
Directorate in the mid-1980s.  According to testimony by Administration officials to the
Senate Government Affairs Committee on February 26, 2003, TTIC will in effect function
as an information analysis center for DHS and DHS will require a smaller number of
analysts with less extensive responsibilities.  
Some observers express concern that the DCI’s role in the TTIC – responsibility for
the analysis of domestically collected information and for maintaining “an up-to-date
database of known and suspected terrorists that will be accessible to federal and non-
federal officials and entities,”12 – might run counter to the statutory provision that
excludes the CIA from “law enforcement or internal security functions.”13  There are also
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questions about transferring the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to the DCI. Some
express concern about how the TTIC under the DCI will coordinate with state and local
officials and with private industry.  
A major concern for some observers is that TTIC may just become an expanded
version of the CTC that has long had representatives from the FBI and other agencies.
They argue that the CTC did not provide advance warning of the September 11 attacks
and that a different approach (such as that envisioned in the Homeland Security Act) is
called for.  There is, thus far, no indication that the Administration will seek modification
of the Homeland Security Act or a legislative charter for TTIC.  Some Members have,
however, asked for a written delineation of responsibilities among the CIA, FBI, DHS,
and TTIC.14
Conclusion
Legislation creating a homeland security department recognized the crucial
importance of intelligence to the counterterrorist effort.  It proposed an analytical office
within DHS that would be able to draw upon the information gathering resources of other
government agencies and of the private sector.  It envisioned the DHS information
analysis entity working closely with other DHS offices, other federal agencies, state and
local officials, and the private sector to devise strategies and programs to protect U.S.
vulnerabilities and to provide warning of specific attacks.  The Administration appears
to prefer a modification to that approach built around a threat integration center that will
be under the direction of the DCI. 
Regardless of where the integrative effort is located, the task will remain
fundamentally the same. Pulling together vast amounts of data concerning terrorist
groups, analyzing them, and reporting threat warning in time to prevent attacks is a
daunting challenge.  Congress will undoubtedly remain interested in organizational
relationships designed to accomplish this task.
